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A
INDOSUEZ INT'L FINANCE V. NAT'L RESERVE BANK
(decided May 7, 2002)

I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts' decisions that New York law governs the forward currency exchange transactions entered into by two foreign
parties. 2 The court held that the New York choice of law provision
in the transactions is valid because New York has the paramount
interest in the transactions. 3 In addition, the court held that New
York has personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant because
the defendant not only consented to be sued in New York but also
had minimum contacts with New York. 4 The court further held
that New York has subject matter jurisdiction under Banking Law
§ 200-b even when plaintiff designated New York as the place of
5
performance after the contracts were executed.
II.

BACKGROUND

This case was brought to recover debts arising from the breach
of a series of currency exchange agreements. 6 Indosuez International Finance (11F), a Netherlands corporation, and National Reserve Bank (NRB), a Russian bank, entered into fourteen future
currency exchange contracts from September 1997 through July
1998. 7 Each of the transactions was confirmed and signed on behalf of NRB by its deputy chairman of the board. The contracts
specified the settlement dates and forward rates. 8
The transactions were denominated in U.S. dollars and their
value depended on the depreciation or appreciation of the Russian
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

98 N.Y.2d 238 (2002).
Id. at 242.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 243.
Indosuez, 98 N. Y2d 238 at 242.
Id.
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ruble against the U.S. dollar. 9 If on the settlement date, the ruble
had depreciated against the dollar, NRB would pay IIF in dollars.
However, if the ruble appreciated, IIF would pay NRB in dollars. 10
In effect, the parties bet on the improving relationship between the
value of the ruble against the U.S. dollar.
Seven of the agreements were option transactions requiring IIF
to pay NRB an option premium. 1 Under these option transactions, in consideration of the option premium, NRB waived its
rights to payment even if the ruble appreciated against the dollar.
11F paid the option premiums on six out of seven transactions to a
2
New York bank designated by NRB.'
Ten of the fourteen agreements contained New York choice of
law clauses, and the remaining four had English choice of law
clauses.' 3 Two of the confirmations required payment to be made
through Bank of America in New York; the rest required the affected party to be paid through whichever bank that party designated.' 4 Six of the confirmations contained New York forum
selection clauses, and the other eight either had no forum selection
clause or designated the "courts of England or any other courts of
5
competent jurisdiction."'1
In the summer of 1998, Russia had a currency crisis causing a
precipitous decline in the value of the ruble against the U.S. dollar.
As a result, the Russian Central Bank and Russian government declared a 90-day moratorium prohibiting Russian residents from pay16
ing nonresidents under forward currency exchange transactions.
This moratorium on the payment of foreign debts triggered a
breach of the contracts. According to the terms of the International Swap Dealers Association Master Agreement (ISDA), which
was incorporated by reference to the transactions, the moratorium
was illegal.1 7 This "illegality" allowed IIF to declare an "Early Termination Date" for transactions having settlement dates falling dur9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 242.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d 238 at 243.
Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d 238 at 243.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ing the moratorium period.18 11F notified NRB of the breach and
instructed NRB to pay the amount due into an account in New
York. NRB failed to pay, resulting in a debt of more than $110
million. 19
11F brought an action in the supreme court alleging breach of
the agreements. 20 NRB filed an answer, with several affirmative defenses. NRB claimed Russian law applied. Under Russian statute,
NRB argued, the transactions are void because they were not signed
and approved by NRB's Accountant General as required.2 1 However, 11F maintained that New York law applied the contracts were
valid. 11F argued that the deputy chairman had apparent authority
to bind NRB, and also argued that NRB ratified the contracts by
accepting the option premiums. 22 11F moved for summary judgment and the court granted partial summary judgment to 11F as to
liability. The court rejected NRB's arguments and found that New
York and English law govern the contracts. Under either law, the
court reasoned, the contracts are valid and NRB was in breach.
Then, the court referred the case to a referee to calculate damages.
The referee determined the damages, including interests and attorney's fees, to be over $19 million. The Supreme Court approved
the damages. NRB appealed.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed the trial court's decision. 23 The appellate division
held that the parties would not be bound by choice of law or forum
selection clauses if the contracts themselves were invalid.2 4 However, applying New York traditional choice of law rules, the appellate division held that New York law applied and the contracts were
valid. 25 The court emphasized that because payments under the
transactions were denominated in U.S. dollars, and payments were
to be made through a New York bank, New York had a "paramount
18.
Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 243.
19.
Id.
20. International Indosuez Fin. B.V. v. Nat'l Reserve Bank, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
476 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Indosuez Int'l Fin. B.V. v. Nat'lReserve Bank, 720 N.Y.S.2d 102 (App. Div.
2001).
24. Id. at 103.
25. Id.
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interest, as an international clearinghouse and marketplace for a
plethora of international transactions denominated in U.S. dollars,
26
in ensuring orderly dollar currency transactions."
The court also found the contracts valid under New York law
on the grounds of apparent authority and ratification. 27 The court
reasoned that the deputy chairman lacked actual authority to bind
NRB, but he had apparent authority. 28 The court further held that

NRB ratified the transactions by accepting the premium payments
29
from IIF and never objected to the deputy chairman's authority.
The court also held that New York had personal jurisdiction over
NRB and New York courts have subject matter jurisdiction. 30 NRB
appealed the case to the New York Court of Appeals.
III.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals was faced with
three issues. The questions presented were whether New York or
Russian law governed the transactions whether New York had personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant, and whether New
York courts had subject matter jurisdiction. 3 1 The court began its
decision by concluding that New York law governed the transac32
tions and unanimously affirmed the lower courts' decisions.
A. Choice of Law
NRB argued that Russian law governed the transactions and
under Russian law the contracts were void. 33 NRB emphasized that,
in determining the applicable law, the court must consider two dif34
ferent issues that required two distinct choice of law analyses.
The court must first consider whether the deputy chairman had the
authority to bind NRB under Russian law. Second, the court must
26. Indosuez Int'l Fin. B.V. v. Nat'l Reserve Bank, 720 N.Y.2d 102, 103 (App. Div.
2001) (citingJ. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220
(1975)).
27. Indosuez, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
28. Id.
29. Indosuez, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
30. Id.
31. Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 240.
32. Id.
33. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d 238 (1 No. 38).
34. Id. at 15-16.
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determine whether the contracts were valid.3 5 In attempting to
prove Russian law governed the contracts, NRB introduced the affirmation of an expert on Russian law.3 6 The expert testified,
under Article 7 of the Russian Law of Accounting, only the Accountant General of NRB had the authority to sign the transactions. 37 Since the Accountant General did not sign the
38
confirmations, NRB argued, they were void.
NRB further argued that applying New York substantive law to
the agency question would violate NRB's right to due process of law
under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 39 NRB maintained that New York had no relationship with the agency issue because both the purported agent and the principal are Russian
40
residents and all contacts occurred in Russia.
On the other hand, 11F argued that New York law governed the
transactions. 4 1 IFF maintained that the deputy chairman may not
have had actual authority to bind NRB, but he had apparent authority to act on NRB's behalf. IIF further argued that NRB ratified
the contracts by accepting IIF's option premiums, and NRB should
also be estopped from contesting the validity of the confirmations
because it never objected to the deputy's authority prior to the
lawsuit.42

In resolving the choice of law issue, the court rejected NRB's
arguments and held that New York law applies. The court noted
that NRB failed to show that a principle of apparent authority simi43
lar to the law of New York does not exist in Russian law.

Under a traditional New York choice of law analysis, a court is
required to apply the law of the state that has the most significant
35.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d 238 (1 No. 38).
36. Id. at 46-47 (citing Lyubarskaya Aff. Para 7, dated May 13, 1999 (NRB offered
this affirmation in evidence to the trial court as proof that the contracts were invalid
under Russian law)).
37.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d 238 (1 No. 38) at 46-47.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 35-38.
40. Id.
41.
11F Brief, pg.5 (brief submitted to New York Court of Appeals, dated February
19, 2002).
42. 11F Brief, pg.5 (brief submitted to New York Court of Appeals, dated February
19, 2002).
43. Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at n.3.
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relationship to the particular issue in conflict. 44 The law of the
state having the greatest interest in the litigation will be applied. 45
The state interests to be considered are those that relate to the pur46
pose of the particular law in conflict.
Applying the significant relationship test, the court concluded
that New York law applies because New York has a greater interest
in the litigation than Russia. 4 7 The court reaffirmed the Appellate
Division's reasoning that New York has the paramount interest because of the types of contracts involved.4 8 The parties entered into
the forward currency exchange transactions to hedge losses on
their investments. They selected the use of New York law and forum because of New York's experience with and ability to ensure
orderly dollar currency transactions. 49 The parties agreed that payments were to be made in U.S. dollars, 11F paid premiums to NRB
through a New York bank, and two confirmations required payment
to be made to a New York bank. Therefore, New York had the para50
mount interest in enforcing the transactions.
On the other hand, Russia's interests were not as great as those
of New York. 51 NRB's defaults were precipitated by a Russian currency crisis and the Russian government declared a moratorium on
the repayment of foreign debt, triggering the breach. 52 The parties
did not select Russian law. Thus, Russia's interests could not have
53
been greater than New York's.

After concluding New York law governs, the court held that the
54
contracts are valid under New York substantive agency law.
Under New York agency law, the deputy chairman had apparent
authority to bind NRB, and 11F was reasonable in relying on the
deputy's authority. 55 The deputy had signed five (5) prior similar
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

SeeJ. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d at 226-227 (1975).
Restatement 2nd of Conflict of Laws §§ 188 (1), 292 (1).
Id.
Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 241.
Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 241.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 245.
Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 246.
Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 246.
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56
transactions' and NRB collected over $33 million from IIF. NRB
accepted premium payments through a New York bank on six option transactions from IIF and did not object to the deputy's authority. Such conduct, the court concluded, constitutes an implied
representation that the deputy chairman had authority to bind
NRB. 5 7 Further, NRB ratified the transactions because it accepted
the premiums and did not raise the authority issue during the
course of performance. 58 Instead, NRB acknowledged the debt in
its letters to 11F. 59 Therefore, the court concluded that the contracts are valid and enforceable.

B.

PersonalJurisdiction

After concluding that New York law governs the contracts, the
court addressed the second issue of whether New York could exercise personal jurisdiction over NRB under the New York long arm
statute. NRB argued that New York had no personal jurisdiction
over it regarding the confirmations that did not contain a New York
forum selection clause. The court rejected this argument and concluded that personal jurisdiction was properly exercised on two
grounds: consent and minimum contacts. 60
First, the court concluded that NRB consented to personal jurisdiction by expressly including New York forum selection clauses
in six confirmations. Since the fourteen confirmations form a
global agreement, the forum selection clauses are incorporated in
the other eight transactions that did not contain any forum selection provisions. 6 1
Second, NRB had the requisite minimum contacts with New
York to support the constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Since the New York long arm statute is limited and is not equal to
the limit of due process, the court cited CPLR Section 302 (a) (1) to
support the statutory basis.6 2 The court also said exercising per56. hIF brief.
57. Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 241.
58. Id.
Id. at n.4.
59.
60. Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 246-48.
61.
Id.
62. Id. at 246. CPLR Section 302(a)(1) gives the court authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant when the defendant transacts busi-
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sonal jurisdiction over NRB did not offend the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 6 3
NRB received premium payments from IIF through a New York
bank, two confirmations designated New York as the place of performance, payments on five prior transactions were made in New
York bank, and NRB had a bank account in New York. Through
these transactions, NRB purposefully availed itself of the privileges
and benefts of the laws of New York. 64 Therefore, these contacts
are sufficient to subject NRB to personal jurisdiction in New York.
C.

Subject MatterJurisdiction

The court briefly decided the third issue by concluding that
New York courts have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
under Banking Law § 200-b. This statute grants subject matter jurisdiction over claims by foreign parties where the action is brought
to recover damages for the breach of a contract made or to be per65
formed within the state.
NRB argued that the courts of New York lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims because IIF designated New York as the
place of performance after the contracts were executed. However,
IIF argued that New York courts have subject matter jurisdiction
because two of the confirmations expressly required payments to be
made through a New York bank. Further, the other twelve confirmations granted the affected party the right to designate the place
of payment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected NRB's arguments and held that New York courts have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. The court emphasized that subject matter
jurisdiction under Banking Law Section 200-b extends to claims
where a party chooses New York for the place of performance even
after the contract is formed. 66
ness in New York or contracts anywhere to provide goods and services in New York, and
the cause of action arises out of the contacts.
63. Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 247. Due process requires a non-domiciliary defendant
to have minimum contacts with a forum state in order for the state to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Exercising personal jurisdiction cannot offend the
traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice.
64. Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 247.
65. N.Y. Banking Law § 200-b (2) (McKinney 2001).
66. Indosuez, 98 N.Y.2d at 248.
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CONCLUSION

In Indosuez v. NationalReserve Bank, the New York Court of Appeals held that New York substantive law applied to a series of forward currency exchange transactions entered into by the parties,
thereby affirming the decision of the Appellate Division. It held
that under New York's substantive law of agency, the contracts were
valid and enforceable because the agent of NRB who signed the
contracts had apparent authority, upon which IIF reasonably relied.
The court also held that New York had both personal and subject
matter jurisdiction over NRB.
Jean-Michel Voltaire

